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From Penal Welfarism to the Penal State 
 





The article traces the return of  prison labour for commercial purposes in the United States. In the age 
of  Fordism, work for commercial purposes was prohibited in prisons; the emphasis was on 
rehabilitation. This “penal welfarism” gave way to a “penal state” of  extremely high incarceration rates 
and exploitative prison labour. While this shift mirrors the turn to neo-liberalism, it is also the result 
of  specific labour market conditions and racial discrimination. 
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Prisoners are rarely visible in everyday life. This holds true all the more so for their labour behind iron 
bars. They also seem to be quite invisible in the field of  labour studies. While an increasing number of  
inmates around the world are forced to work, their working conditions have received scant attention. 
The relationship between incarceration rates, prison labour, profit interests and the labour market is 
also understudied. 
This article addresses both areas of  neglect. We want to call attention to the miserable 
remuneration of  prison labour and we want to contribute to a better theoretical understanding of  the 
drivers of  prison labour. We have chosen the United States of  America as our empirical example. It is 
the country with the highest per capita incarceration rate in the world, and where inmates are not only 
working to maintain overall prison operations but also for profitable industries. But most important 
for theoretical considerations, the high incarceration rates and prison labour for commercial purposes 
have not been a permanent feature of  the American penal system. In fact, in the Fordist period (1940s 
to 1970s) the level of  the prison population was low, work for commercial purposes was prohibited, 
and emphasis was, at least rhetorically, placed on the reintegration of  felons into society. This period, 
perhaps a bit euphemistically called “penal welfarism”, gave way to the current situation of  a “penal 
state”. It mirrors the shift from Fordism, the period of  a social compromise between capital and labour, 
to today’s neo-liberalism, a period characterised by the hegemony of  private property holders. The 
analysis of  this shift will shed light on the relationship between modes of  production, the labour 
market and criminalisation. 
The parallels between these two shifts, however, should be treated with caution. Just as neo-
liberalism is not without contradictions, resistance and manifold manifestations across time and nations 
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(Cerny, 2008), the penal state comes also in different forms and intensities.  
In the case of  the United States, racism leaves a huge imprint on the system of  state-sanctioned 
punishment. Therefore, we will not only extend our look backwards to the nineteenth century to trace 
the legacy of  slavery, but also approach the topic of  prison labour from a political economy perspective 
that includes matters of  race. 
The article is structured as follows. First, we develop our theoretical approach of  (multi-layered) 
discourse analysis. Second, we portray the role of  incarceration policies, prison labour and socio-
economic conditions in the USA from the beginning of  the nineteenth century until the time of  
Fordism. Against this background, we will then show how the changes of  these conditions in the 1970s 
and 1980s have transformed the role of  prisons and prison labour. Subsequently, the diverse drivers 
of  prison labour will be explored in more detail and their interrelation will be addressed. 
 
 
Theoretical Approaches to Prison Labour 
The discipline of  criminology covers the topic prison labour from the perspective of  the possibilities 
for rehabilitation of  felons (Price, Pierson and Coleman, 2012). Criminology, however, does not 
explain the occurrence of  commercial prison labour. The field of  political economy provides only a 
few and partially contradictory explanations for the phenomenon of  prison labour. If  one follows Karl 
Marx’ reasoning about the formal and the real subsumption of  labour, then the exertion of  direct 
compulsion to work – that is, the formal subsumption of  labour – does belong to the early days of  
capitalism. Developed capitalism, on the other hand, would be characterised by real subsumption of  
labour. Since connections to self-sustaining agriculture are cut, there would be no alternative for those 
without capital than wage labour, and the work cycle of  machines as well as the digital monitoring of  
labour processes within administrations would make the direct exertion of  physical force as an 
incentive to work redundant (Schmiede, 1988). In the mid-1970s criminological reform-oriented actors 
in the USA even imagined the impending abolition of  prisons (Dodge, 1975). But just as slave labour 
exists globally today next to free wage work, prison labour is not only still here, but is gaining steam. 
From the perspective of  Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer (1968 [1939]), the reintroduction 
of  prison labour without the intention of  rehabilitation is not so surprising. The two authors analysed 
prison labour in relation to labour market conditions eighty years ago. They argue that the supply and 
demand conditions of  the labour market as well as the condition of  public budgets influence the type 
of  penalties applied by the state. For example, in case of  an oversupply of  labour the main motive for 
prison labour will not be rehabilitation but the disciplining of  labour. While we acknowledge the value 
of  their work, we share the critique of  David Garland (1990: 108) that for Rusche and Kirchheimer, 
as well as for their “rediscoverers” Dario Melossi and Massimo Pavarini (1981), economic factors are 
determinant in the last instance. In comparison, we find the approach of  Garland more convincing. A 
complex institution such as punishment requires an analysis from different perspectives, whereby the 
exploration of  causal connections among a variety of  factors should be prioritised over the 
identification of  one main factor. Therefore, Garland drew on insights not only from the Marxist 
tradition but also from the sociological works of  Durkheim, Foucault, Weber, and Elias (Garland, 
1985). In Garland’s work racism played only a subordinated role. More recent literature, however, 
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considers racism as a rather important driver of  the rapid increase of  the prison population (Wacquant, 
2009; Alexander, 2010). 
For an understanding of  the return of  commercial prison labour in the United States, we will 
look at the manifold developments in the field of  punishment. The different theoretical perspectives 
will find an integrating link in Ernesto Laclau’s discourse analysis. His understanding of  discourse 
includes collective and individual practices as well as verbal and written utterances (Laclau, 1990). His 
main premise is radical contingency which, contrary to some of  his critics, does not deny structures. 
The closure of  structures is denied, but not their existence. Contingency should not be confused with 
randomness. It should be understood as a horizon of  possibilities shaped by specific conditions 
(Wullweber and Scherrer, 2011). Therefore, one has to analyse on the one hand the interaction of  
various structuring discourses (in terms of  meaning making and praxis) and to explore on the other 
hand contingency – that is, the possibilities for change. Applied to our topic, this means identifying 
the various elements of  the prison labour discourse, including their genesis. The task is to trace the 
interaction of  political, economic and socio-cultural developments which have brought about the 
return of  prison labour for commercial purposes. 
We will approach this task by first describing the different phases of  the historical development 
of  confinement and prison labour in the United States. Against this backdrop, we will identify the main 
elements of  the current discourse of  prison labour. Among these elements is the disciplining of  those 
who are not in demand in the labour market and are, therefore, in a vulnerable position. This element 
gains in salience with the increasing pressure on public budgets (the two arguments of  Rusche and 
Kirchheimer). Another element is the racist discourse which excludes significant parts of  the African-
American population from the labour market and marginalises Latin American migrants (the argument 
of  Alexander). In addition, one has to take into account the lobbying by private prison corporations. 
The analysis of  the interplay of  these discourses allows us to reflect on the opportunities as well as 
the limits for (commercial) prison labour.  
 
 
Incarceration and Prison Labour: Oscillating between Re-socialisation and 
Profit 
Prison labour is not a novelty in modern history. The concept mainly feeds on two ideas of  limited 
compatibility: re-socialisation through work and economic utilisation of  the workforce. After the 
American Revolution, longer prison sentences became prevalent as punishments for male delinquents. 
This was seen as the more appropriate punitive form compared to the previously common hanging, 
torturing or pillorying. The extended time in prison was supposed to be conducive to atonement and 
the work to be conducive to acquiring skills and lawful habits. After 1820, however, a contractual labour 
system became dominant on a large scale, where the prisons’ operators were renting out the prisoners 
to private persons and companies (McLennan, 2008). In the Southern states, after the emancipation 
of  the slaves, this system took on a massive scale, in a sense as a substitute for slavery. The old and 
new elites of  the South remained interested to an equal extent in keeping up this forced labour 
(Lichtenstein, 1997), both to supply workers for the plantations, but also to build and maintain 
infrastructure. To achieve this, the threshold for arrests were lowered (the so-called Pig Laws) and 
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prison terms extended. Since the private users of  the prisoners’ labour power did not own the 
prisoners, their interest in maintaining the exploited prisoners was even less than in in the case of  
slaves. Work conditions were accordingly brutal (Oshinsky, 1996). An intended side effect was the 
disciplining of  the black population and free workers. In case of  protests, the latter had to fear losing 
their workplace to a prisoner (Mancini, 1996). 
Nevertheless, rebellions did take place, and an armed revolt of  mineworkers in the periphery of  
the Southern states (Eastern Tennessee) in 1891 accelerated the turning away from the contract labour 
system (Mancini, 1996), which had been criticised equally by small peasants and plantation owners for 
favouring large plantations. However, other forms of  forced labour superseded the renting-out 
practice. In Mississippi, this happened in 1894 via state-owned prisons and farms (Oshinsky, 1996). In 
Georgia, the system persisted until 1909 and was then replaced by the chain gang prison system, where 
prisoners would have to carry out infrastructural work while being chained to each other (Lichtenstein, 
1997). These practices only came to an end in the course of  the 1960s civil rights movement. 
In the Northern states the electorate in the state of  New York in 1883 voted in favour of  
abolishing the contractual labour system. Next to bourgeois reformist forces, which rejected this 
system as being “un-republican”, it has been mainly trade unions agitating against unfair competition. 
The loss of  private demand presented the prison authorities with the challenge of  how to discipline 
the prisoners via work. Thus, qualification programmes have been established, leisure-time possibilities 
created and therapies offered, at least at places where sufficient tax revenues were available. These 
experiments in the Progressive Era laid the ground for a “new criminal law science” of  re-socialisation, 
which gained leverage with the New Deal of  the 1930s. The exertion of  brute force was replaced by 
the “managerial” concept of  rewarding good conduct with early release (McLennan, 2008: 378). 
In 1930, shortly before the New Deal and in reaction to the Great Depression, the Smoot-
Hartley Tariff  Act legislated an import ban on goods produced by forced and compulsory labour. The 
US government was also a driving force for Convention No. 29 of  the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), adopted in the same year, which principally bans forced and compulsory labour. 
In due course, prison labour was forbidden within the United States as “unfair competition” to the 
free labour market – a success which can be primarily ascribed to the relatively strong industrial trade 
unions and smaller enterprises potentially in competition with the products of  prison labour.  
Throughout the entire Fordist era – that is, for more than three decades (until 1975) – the 
number of  inmates remained relatively stable between 150 000 and 200 000. The per-capita 
incarceration rate stayed at approximately one per thousand (Western and Pettit, 2010). Bourgeois-
liberal rights such as fair and equal treatment in court, protection through the Constitution and the 
prohibition to take another person’s freedom or life without proper court procedures have been 
extended during the post-war period.  
Thus, the similar outlook on prison labour of  progressive bourgeois reformists, trade unions 
and those companies whose methods of  production and personnel management were no longer 
dependent on direct force has contributed to a fundamental reform of  statutory offences and punitive 
conduct. In the transition from extensive accumulation, accompanied by physical force, towards 
intensive accumulation, steered by the rhythm of  machines – that is, from formal to real subsumption 
– governmental disciplining techniques also changed. In the context of  policies against crime, one can 
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speak about a specific period of  Fordist Welfare, at least with regard to what was claimed. In an 
increasingly liberal social climate, underpinned by growing prosperity and improved social security, 
prison labour seemed to be overcome for the first time in US history. 
The relative loss of  importance of  the prison as a focal point of  societal disciplining was not 
limited to the United States. Especially within European states the number of  prisons decreased during 
the Fordist period and reached a historic minimum in many places (De Giorgi, 2006: 90). 
 
 
After the Civil Rights Movement: Blacks into Prisons 
The impressive success of  the civil rights movement, and the adoption of  the civil rights laws in 1964, 
was followed soon by severe conflicts between some people of  black and white skin colour in the 
North of  the United States. Agricultural mechanisation in the South released many black peasant 
families, who migrated to the North’s and the West Coast’s industrial cities, attracted by the Fordist 
demand for labour and the less discriminating social climate. Having arrived there, it quickly became 
obvious that, despite the now-secured civil rights, many of  them were still being prohibited from 
participating in the American Dream of  equal opportunities. Particularly after the murder of  the most 
prominent civil rights activist, Martin Luther King, in 1968, protests erupted in many ghettos of  the 
Northern states’ metropoles. These degenerated into violence, not least because of  the brutal 
behaviour of  then almost exclusively white police forces.  
In reaction to these “riots”, the exodus of  the white population from the inner cities began to 
speed up. The attempt to overcome the ensuing renewed segregation of  black and white through the 
mixing of  schools by providing bus transport for pupils from one quarter of  the city to the other, 
triggered heavy protests on the side of  the white population (Sears and Kinder, 1985). At the same 
time, owing to different factors, including the large birth cohorts of  young people (the so-called baby 
boom), easier access to drugs and the return of  demoralised soldiers from the Vietnam War, the 
criminal rates of  metropoles were rising. Whereas the number of  homicides in the 1950s was slightly 
below 5 per 100 000 inhabitants per year, these doubled from the mid-1960s till the mid-1970s towards 
10 per 100 000 inhabitants (Pinker, 2011: 139).  
The white majority population interpreted the rising crime rates as a “black” phenomenon. In 
the 1970s and 1980s, the Republican Nixon and Reagan administrations pursued a “law and order” 
policy which – supported by the mass media – specifically devoted itself  to the “war against drugs” 
and the incarceration of  the “criminal underclass”. The public discourse of  endorsing civil rights for 
blacks lost its appeal and the pre-Fordist discourse of  “dangerous classes” surfaced again. This time it 
targeted not workers but black young men (Morris, 2001). This conservative strategy aimed at securing 
the traditional status differences vis-à-vis the black population. In the words of  Michelle Alexander 
(2010), the “racial hierarchy” was once more secured. With their law-and-order slogans, right-wing 
politicians succeeded in winning over parts of  the white workforce tending to lean towards liberal 
Democrats. The result was a general shift of  the political spectrum towards the right (Davis, 1986). 
The criminology discourse reflected that shift. The idea of  the possibility of  re-socialisation seemed 
increasingly illusory. Instead, experts, large parts of  the electorate and politicians considered an 
enlarged police presence and harsher penalties to be appropriate solutions (Wacquant, 2009). 
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Moreover, some parts of  the ghetto population, who were especially afflicted with drug-related crimes, 
supported more repressive prosecutorial policies (Fortner, 2015). 
Just as the progressive prison reformers and trade unions had prepared the ground for the 
Fordist era, the law-and-order propagandists contributed to the turn towards neo-liberalism. Whereas 
during the first paradigm change the Northern states were the ones to “universalise” their values 
throughout the United States, this time the Southern states, which had only marginally been integrated 
into the Fordist welfare state, have “universalised” their racism (Wacquant, 2009: chapter 2). Although 
the Southern states had to give up their formal discrimination of  Afro-Americans, not only were their 
policies of  excluding trade unions and their meagre social and educational expenditures spreading over 
the whole country, their practice to brand black people as criminals was diffusing as well. 
 
 
Repressive Laws: Explosion of the Number of Prisoners 
Since the mid-1970s the number of  inmates has been rising in unprecedented numbers, from 
approximately 200 000 in 1975 to 2 300 000 in 2013 (Carson, 2014). On top of  this, there are 
approximately 5 million more people today who do not serve time in prison only because of  caution 
money or probation, but are nevertheless under penal control (The Sentencing Project, 2015). This 
expansion of  the penal state was much driven by the widening of  statutory offenses for non-violent 
delicts (such as drug abuse and public urination) and increased minimum penalties. 
The principle of  “indeterminate sentencing” prevailed since the 1920s. Prison terms were 
imposed for a range of  years (e.g. two to ten years), and delinquents could be set free on probation 
due to their “good” behaviour or “re-socialisation” progress. At the end of  the 1970s and the 
beginning of  the 1980s, this principle was abandoned in most states and replaced by relatively precise 
terms of  prison (“determinate sentencing”), where the convicted had to spend the major part of  their 
sentence (between 75 and 100 per cent) in prison (“truth in sentencing”). Furthermore, in 1986 a 
minimum prison term for drug crime (mostly possession measured in grams) has been determined, 
yet without considering the extent of  damage, the criminal record of  the convict or the factual 
circumstance, and without the possibility of  early release (Wacquant, 2009: 65ff.). In the 1990s, a 
number of  state governments significantly increased the sentences for recidivist offenders. In the case 
of  three particularly serious offences, or three offenses which come under this regulation (“three-
strikes laws”), the offenders will automatically be sentenced with “life imprisonment” or “25 years up 
to lifelong” (Wacquant, 2009: 67).  
After the first wave of  mass incarcerations in the 1980s, the growth of  the prison population 
was increasingly feeding on repeat offenders. Toughened conditions of  probation enabled the renewed 
criminalisation and repeated imprisonment of  former prisoners. Overdrawing one’s account with a 
few hundred dollars, for example, could result in renewed imprisonment for several years for convicts 
on probation. Nearly half  of  the 423 000 detainees who were released in 1998 were back in jail shortly 
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Taking Blacks to Prison 
Especially the much-invoked “war against drugs” significantly discloses the racist dimension of  the 
mass incarcerations. In 1975 approximately 27 per cent of  detainees in federal prisons were convicted 
of  a drug-related offence. Only ten years later this number was already at 34 per cent, in 1990 at more 
than 50 per cent and in 1995 at about 61 per cent (Wacquant, 2002: 63). The group of  people being 
imprisoned because of  substance abuse did not at all reflect the actual proportions of  drug consumers. 
Whereas the Afro-American population only constitutes 13 per cent of  drug consumers (roughly 
corresponding to their demographic weight), they represent one-third of  all imprisoned persons and 
three-quarters of  all those who were imprisoned because of  drug-related offenses. Therefore, the 
probability for a black man to be incarcerated for a delinquency related to drugs is more than twenty-
five times higher than for a white man (Wacquant, 2009: 61). The difference between cocaine powder 
and crack played a major role. Crack was easier to produce and, therefore, more popular in the Afro-
American ghettos. In contrast to cocaine powder, the ownership of  just a few grams of  crack was 
punished with long minimum prison terms. In 1995, for the first time in the country’s history, the 
majority of  the prison population was black, although blacks at this time constituted only 12 per cent 
of  the general population (Wacquant, 2009: 61). 
The growing (educational) inequality between black and white groups of  the population 
contributed significantly to an increase of  the black prison population. Due to the exodus from the 
cities by many American companies since the 1960s, the municipalities’ tax revenues were rapidly 
shrinking. As a result, they lacked the means for maintaining the traditional standards in public schools. 
At the same time the more affluent white people were increasingly moving into the suburbs and 
sending their children to private schools more often. Already in 1989, every fifth white child between 
the ages of  four and fifteen was attending a private school (Duster, 1999: 184f.). The lack of  a good 
education excluded many black youth from the regular labour market. Without good job prospects, a 
significant proportion of  young African-American men turned to illegal activities and ended up in 
prison. In 2008, 37 per cent of  the 20 to 34 age group had been imprisoned, more than those with a 
job (26 per cent) (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2010: 3; Western and Pettit, 2010: 10). Critical voices are 
even speaking of  a “School-to-Prison Pipeline” (Kilgore, 2015: 119ff.). 
Moreover, during the last decade the spectrum of  target groups for imprisonment has been 
extended. Besides the war against drugs, the “war against illegal immigration” is increasingly filling up 
US prisons. Since 2006, migration offenses represent the most common reason for detentions and 




Disciplining the Marginalised  
The transition from the punishing state – that is, the gradual and comprehensive expansion of  criminal 
persecution and mass incarcerations – is closely linked to the cuts in state welfare spending and 
welfare’s neo-liberal restructuring (Wacquant, 2009). A study by Beckett and Western (2001) attests 
that, especially in states with traditionally lower social security benefits or with strong cuts into the 
social security net, the prison population was disproportionately large).  
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While social programmes aim at social peace, prisons serve as deterrents with the objective of  
disciplining. The prison, as emphasised by Michelle Alexander (2010: 208), is an expression of  “social 
disapproval” towards groups with little success in the labour market. It is denigrating them morally as 
well as factually (the denial of  voting rights)1 to second-class citizens.  
The deterrent, disciplining moment of  this policy of  mass incarceration consists first of  all in 
the demonstration of  the lack of  alternatives to precarious working and living conditions, which 
cannot be circumvented – neither by “hanging around in the streets” nor by profitable illegal deals 
(drug trafficking). Those who resist the disciplining of  the work society have to expect prison. 
However, taking into account the high number of  repeated detentions, the deterrent effect, particularly 
for the male black population, should not be over-estimated. For those, direct disciplining has priority. 
The deterrent effect of  the mass incarceration policy and the compliance-creating pressure for those 
who have not been imprisoned, might turn out to be larger for migrants without residence permits.  
Historically, the justifications for mass incarceration were not entirely novel. In his works, 
Bernard Harcourt (2011: 271ff) impressively shows the parallels between (market) liberal discourses 
of  the nineteenth century and the expansion of  the prison regime at that time on the one hand, and 
the rise of  mass incarceration in the 1970s and 1980s under the teachings of  the neo-liberal “Chicago 
School” on the other hand. Moreover, the rather recent history of  mass incarceration shows that a free 




The Liberal Paradox and the Outsourcing of Costs 
The consistent disciplining of  “superfluous workers” (Gans, 2012) via mass imprisonment resulted in 
a neo-liberal paradox. Although “small government” was at the centre of  neo-liberal restructuring, the 
expenditures for security and prisons were rising steeply. The budget of  police, justice and the penal 
system tripled between 1982 and 2002. Expenditures for the penal system alone, mostly for the 
construction and maintenance of  prisons, increased from approximately US$20 billion in 1982 to 
US$75 billion in 2002 (based on inflation-adjusted prices of  2007) (Bureau of  Justice, 2017). 
Municipal and state budgets were increasingly put under pressure. Eventually, the costs for the 
maintenance of  prisons per person surpassed the college fees of  Ivy-League universities such as 
Harvard (Kilgore, 2015: 12). Strategies to manage the cost pressure have been diverse. In addition to 
overcrowding, opportunities for training and rehabilitation were cut. From there it was only a small 
step to propose the utilisation of  the prisoners’ labour power as a source of  income.  
The discourse on financing prisons and their detainees moved from “public assistance” to “self-
financing”. Prison inmates are now expected to contribute their own share to the costs of  their 
imprisonment. In neo-liberalism the detention itself  is becoming a self-inflicted penalty for which the 
prisoner (including relatives) has to literally pay: processing charges for visits, rents for bed, and co-
financing for medical care or other “services” such as electricity and laundry. In many cases prisoners 
are released with bills for prison services of  several thousand dollars (Levingston, 2007). In addition, 
                                               
1 More than 6 million people in the US have lost their right to vote due to an entry in their police record. 
 
Global Labour Journal, 2017, Issue 8(1), Page 40 
 
the neo-liberal idea that private companies perform public tasks more cost-efficiently gained 
dominance, also regarding the operation of  prisons. 
 
 
The Re-commodification of Prison Labour 
The Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program (PIECP) of  1979 established the legal 
framework for private companies contracting prison labour and operating prisons themselves. The 
Percy Amendment of  the same year legalised the sale of  prison goods under limited conditions. 
Influential interest groups like the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), founded in 1973 
as an association of  conservative entrepreneurs and politicians, supported the policy of  mass 
incarceration and demanded to legalise the exploitation of  the prisoners’ labour power (Thompson, 
2012: 41).  
The number of  prisoners working for private companies, however, remained rather low at 
federal prisons. There were never more than 30 000 prisoners employed in the two main federal prison 
labour programmes. The PIECP allows private companies such as Boeing, Starbucks, Victoria’s Secret 
and others to contract with public prisons, but it employed only about 4 700 inmates in 2015. This 
rather low demand for prison labour is not the least the result of  strict transparency requirements. The 
programme’s administrators not only have to document and publish the exact number of  prisoners 
working for a wage, but also the name of  their employers. Moreover, trade unions and local companies 
have to be consulted before the contract is signed. Participating companies are obliged to pay the 
minimum wage. The prisoners, however, are not paid the minimum wage. The effective wage is reduced 
by about 60 per cent through deductions for taxes, accommodation and meals, and for the support of  
crime victims’ families as well as for the victims themselves. Many of  these requirements reflect the 
anxiety of  the Fordist era about the competition from prison labour. The participating companies, 
however, may promote their products made in prison with the label “Made in America” (Lichtenstein, 
2015).  
Besides the PIECP, the governmental prison industry company UNICOR is one of  the biggest 
industrial employers for prison inmates on a federal level. In 2015, it employed more than 12 000 
detainees, down from 21 000 in 2008. In other words, nearly every fourteenth federal prisoner works 
for UNICOR. The detainees primarily produce clothes and textiles, electronic goods and office 
furniture, which are mostly sold to governmental authorities (FPI, 2014: 9). Since 2012, however, 
UNICOR may also sell to private firms under certain conditions. This business branch is only in its 
infancy. By far the largest purchaser remains the Defense Department. UNICOR manufactures 
uniforms, (parts of) weapons, radios and communication tools for hourly wages of  US$0.23 up to 
US$1.15 in the prisons (Urbina, 2014: 110f.; Wood, 2015). Significantly worse working conditions than 
on the free labour market are reported, even though trade unions are integrated into these work 
programmes and certain requirements exist (such as formally voluntary participation). For example, 
federal investigators detected a lack of  safety and health provisions at facilities recycling electronic 
waste and manufacturing intermediate products for missiles for the military (Sample, 2009). 
The majority of  the more than 2 million prisoners in the United States live and work not in the 
prisons operated by the Federal Bureau of  Prisons (BOP), however, but in state prisons and jails run 
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by municipalities (about 70 per cent). Almost all of  the fifty states have, following the PIECP, adopted 
similar legislation, although oftentimes with significantly fewer transparency regulations and without 
requirements such as paying minimum wage. Thereby, a patchwork of  decentralised, profit-oriented 
prison industries has developed in the last decades. It is estimated that at least one-tenth of  all detainees 
in the United States work in different prison industries (their share in the prison population able to 
work is higher, since the overall population also includes the chronically ill, minors and retirees). 
Available data on prison labour in the US is, however, very opaque for two main reasons. On the one 
hand, government agencies collect and publish little data on industrial prison labour. While statistics 
on the demographics of  prisoners and reasons for their detention do exist, no information is provided 
on the number of  worked hours, net wages or the concrete working conditions. On the other hand, 
the prison system is divided into different levels: Besides prisons which are operated by the federal 
government or the Federal Bureau of  Prisons, a majority of  detainees serve in jails operated by 
individual states with their own laws on work in prisons. Additionally, people are doing time in local 
jails which are in the charge of  municipal administrations. Furthermore, the growing number of  
privately operated prisons (currently ca. 10 per cent) has to be taken into account; their role will be 
elaborated on in the next section. The depiction of  prison labour is thus very dependent on the reports 
of  investigative journalists. 
In Colorado, for instance, about 1 600 prisoners were employed in thirty-seven different 
industrial sites in 2014; that is approximately 15 per cent of  the prison population were able to work. 
The production reaches from the manufacture of  furniture, licence plates and flags, to agricultural 
produce such as dairy products, fish farming and vegetable cultivation through to services such as car 
repair, construction and landscape gardening. Workers received an average daily wage of  US$3.95 in 
2014 (Colorado Office of  the State Auditor 2015: 9–11). Thus, the hourly wage, assuming a four-hour 
working day, remains under US1.00. Other states give a similar picture. In 2014, 1 600 prisoners were 
employed at forty-five production sites of  the Washington State Correctional Industries. The workers 
represented roughly ten per cent of  inmates in the State of  Washington and were working, like in 
Colorado, for hourly wages of  US$0.55 on average (Berens and Baker, 2014). These low production 
costs enabled by the exploitation of  prison labour, resulting in previously outsourced industries coming 
back to the United States, such as the relocation of  maquiladoras at the Mexican–US border (on 
Mexico’s side) towards prisons in California or Texas (Paleaz, 2014). The declared main objective of  
these governmental, profit-oriented prison industries is to refund, at least partly, the high expenditures 
of  criminal prosecution and the penal system (Berens and Baker, 2014; Colorado Office of  the State 
Auditor, 2015). 
The difference between federal and state prisons concerning the extent and the conditions for 
commercial prison labour is a product of  diverging balances of  power. Trade unions are stronger at 
the federal level than in many US states.  
Altogether, the commercial exploitation of  prison labour, though growing, only affects parts of  
the prison population. The majority of  prisoners work for the preservation of  the prison itself  (in the 
laundry, the kitchen or food distribution, help with administrative issues, etc.). Without this work, the 
system of  mass incarceration, financially as well as organisationally, would hardly be operable (Chang 
and Thompkins, 2002: 56). 
 




The Privatisation of Prisons and Profiting from Migration 
The privatisation of  many prisons, which created a new business opportunity, proceeded parallel to 
the re-commodification of  prison labour. Within three decades the private prison sector was growing 
rapidly and is now guarding about one-tenth of  all prisoners. Among the companies, a few major 
corporations are dominant, particularly the GEO Group and the Corrections Corporation America 
(CCA), which taken together register annual profits of  US$3 billion; they are listed on the New York 
stock exchange. Additionally, a broad network of  companies exists which benefits from mass 
incarcerations and the prison boom. Between 2001 and 2012 the average yearly expenditure only for 
the construction of  prisons amounted to almost US$3 billion. These large-scale infrastructural projects 
are important sources of  income for many regions, particularly those affected by high unemployment 
and poverty (Thorpe, 2015). Besides construction companies, other industries are profiting from the 
prison boom; these include financial institutions supplying the necessary finance, security firms, health 
service providers, and transport companies which specialise in the supply of  prison meals (Herivel and 
Wright, 2007). The term “prison-industrial complex” has been coined for the increasing importance 
of  profit-oriented firms in the prison sector and their interlocking with industrial production, 
governmental authorities and political elites (Friedmann, 2012; Thompson, 2012). Political 
representatives in rural areas with large prisons belong to the most vehement advocates of  more severe 
penal legislation (Thorpe, 2015).  
Although private companies own and operate the prisons, they are paid per prisoner on a daily 
or monthly basis by governmental agencies such as the Federal Bureau of  Prisons, Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the US Marshall per prisoner (Kilgore, 2013; The Geo Group, 2013). 
Besides the construction of  new prisons, private investors also purchased prisons from municipalities, 
regional or federal governments (Chang and Thompkins, 2002: 49). Privatisation has not resulted in 
savings for tax payers despite the paring down of  personnel, declining wages, lower fringe benefits and 
the elimination of  training possibilities for employees – circumstances which have been criticised by 
trade unions for years (Quinell, 2014). 
Especially the business with migration has developed into a profitable branch for private 
companies in the last years. The mandatory detention in the case of  migration offences, which was 
introduced in 1996, resulted in a rapid expansion of  deportation centres. While in 1981 only a dozen 
detention centres existed, their number grew to more than 200 by 2011, with a daily average population 
of  over 32 000 (Kilgore, 2015: 83). While just under one-tenth of  all prisoners serve time in private 
prisons, 40 per cent of  all immigration detention prisons in the US are privately operated. One-third 
of  those detention centre capacities are provided by the two major corporations – CCA and GEO 
Group. In 2012, CCA and the GEO Group concluded contracts for deportation jails with federal 
authorities worth US$738 million. The government pays for the prisoners as long as the companies 
meet a minimum quota (since 2013 this amounts to 34 000 detainees at any moment) (Kilgore, 2015: 
85). Thus, there is an incentive to detain as many people as possible, for as long as possible based on 
migration offenses.  
The interest in large numbers of  prisoners drives the prison companies’ lobbying activities. The 
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three biggest prison companies spent US$40 million on lobbyism in the last ten years, chiefly to 
convince Republicans to tighten immigration laws and introduce a general identity card requirement 
(Friedmann, 2012). In 2010, for instance, the private prison industry was actively involved in the 
drafting and passage of  one the most controversial, broadest and strictest anti-illegal immigration 
measures in the United States at that time – Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 (Detention Watch Network, 
2011). Moreover, former Speaker of  the Florida House of  Representatives, Marco Rubio, awarded a 
US$110 million contract to the GEO Group, and chiefly worked on a comprehensive bill calling for 
stricter immigration laws and tighter controls of  “illegal migration” (Cohen, 2015). Thereafter, his 
election campaign was financially supported by the GEO Group (Walsh, 2016). 
Information about the working conditions in the immigration detention prisons are solely 
provided by newspaper reports. Cases have become repeatedly known where migrants were forced to 
work either without payment or for daily wages below US$1.00 (Planas, 2015). According to 
estimations, all in all 60 000 migrants are working in “voluntary” labour programmes for less than 
US$1.00 daily wage in private as well as in publicly operated institutions (Urbina, 2014). 
 
 
Critique of Prison Labour 
Prison labour is not without contradictions and does not go uncontested. While the extent of  prison 
labour has been increasing in the United States, criticism against Chinese prison labour has been 
levelled towards China again and again within the international trade discourse. This critique has even 
been institutionalised: according to Public Laws 106-398 and 108-7, Congress has to be regularly 
informed about Chinese prison labour. This discourse, however, is completely divorced from the 
discourse on US prison labour – the criticism towards China does not lead to questioning one’s own 
practices (Cowen, 1993; Whyte and Baker, 2000). In fact, prison labour practices in the United States 
generally receive little attention in the American media. 
Changes in prison labour practices might be brought about by the inmates themselves. Recently, 
several attempts at organising have been reported. In September 2016, the Formerly Incarcerated, 
Convicted People and Families Movement (FICPFM) together with the Incarcerated Workers 
Organizing Committee (IWOC) has held a conference on mass incarceration and the exploitation of  
prison labour. At the same time, prisoners required to work went on strike in a number of  prisons. 
Unfortunately, they failed in their objective to put the topic of  prison labour onto the agenda of  the 
presidential elections. The media mostly ignored the strikes. 
At the federal level, the Obama administration took some measures against some of  the most 
discriminatory aspects of  criminal law. It minimised the difference between the penalties for crack and 
cocaine powder. In order to avoid minimum sentences, the amount of  drugs found in the possession 
of  the offenders is no longer mentioned by the prosecutors. And very recently the Obama 
administration decided not to renew the contracts with private prison corporations. This positive trend 
will most certainly end with the Trump administration. Donald Trump’s harsh rhetoric against 
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Conclusion: Prison Labour at the Intersection of Neo-liberalism and Race 
Over the last century, policies of  incarceration and the treatment of  prisoners have mirrored general 
shifts in the political and economic organisation of  society. In the era of  Fordism, rehabilitation of  
delinquent persons dominated the criminal justice discourse, while incarceration numbers were at their 
lowest historical level. In neo-liberal times, rehabilitation as a general principle has been marginalised 
and has made way for the free market ideology. Accordingly, imprisonment is deemed self-inflicted 
and delinquent behaviour is isolated from its societal context – that is, from the political, economic 
and cultural conditions upon which it rests. Since it is self-inflicted, inmates are expected to finance 
the costs of  their own detention through work. The trade union movement, which had successfully 
fought prison labour for commercial purposes during Fordism, has become too weak at the state level 
to prevent this type of  labour exploitation. 
While providing employment for all who wanted to work was an explicit goal under Fordism, in 
the age of  neo-liberalism welfare and labour market policies force as many people as possible into the 
job market without providing sufficient jobs. In the resulting competitive environment, many persons 
fall to the wayside. From the viewpoint of  the employers these people are “expendable”, and from the 
viewpoint of  many wage earners they are “undeserving”. Both viewpoints consider the reasons for 
joblessness as self-inflicted and not as a consequence of  historical or current discrimination. 
Accordingly, the disciplining of  the “superfluous workers” is accepted or even demanded. Moreover, 
the prison regime is casting a shadow on those for whom there is actually demand in the labour market 
but who are only employed under precarious conditions. Due to high sentences and the subsequent 
societal stigmatisation, more profitable employment outside of  legality has become an utterly risky 
alternative. The majority of  the precariously employed are left with no other options.  
Disciplining through imprisonment, however, is expensive. In line with the overall tendency 
towards “personal responsibility”, it comes naturally to let prisoners generate parts of  their 
accommodation costs through work, and to transfer the prisons’ administration to the allegedly more 
efficient private sector. This shift, legally secured since 1979, has created a new actor field interested 
in the expansion of  prison labour. This field is constituted by governmental providers of  the mostly 
still publicly operated prisons and the new private prison companies as well as by the governmental 
and private purchasers of  the prisoners’ products. Private prison operators even promote a stricter 
deportation policy, so that they can exploit healthy migrants for a couple of  months.  
Without the legacy of  slavery and the ensuing racism, however, US incarceration and prison 
labour policies cannot be understood. The widespread racism towards persons with black skin colour 
has led to a disproportionately high imprisonment of  especially black men – frequently for offences 
which are owed to their discrimination in the labour market. Racism also effects the elimination of  the 
large prison population from public discourse, only occasionally disrupted by mass protests against 
police violence. Although the United States is predominantly an immigrant society, the migration of  
foreigners is highly contested. Currently, a significant part of  the American population opposes 
migrants coming from south of  the Rio Grande. The periodically occurring repressive measures 
against people without residence permit mostly remain without resonance in the media, and their fate 
in deportation jails is likewise not part of  public awareness. Having mobilised racist resentments in the 
election campaign, the incoming Trump administration will most likely rescind the belated measures 
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by the Obama administration against the worst forms of  discrimination in the penal system. 
In sum, the evolution of  prison labour has to be seen in the context of  societal phases with their 
specific ideology, modes of  production and balance of  forces, and has to take into account the specific 
conditions of  the labour market as well as the discrimination of  specific social groups in society whose 
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